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Abstract: In the aftermath of the last financial crisis a strong message prevails 
that ‘something’ has to be changed in the manner global finance is governed. 
What exactly this ‘something’ entails and what could constitute the ‘common 
ground’ of anticipated change is more difficult to determine. Many envisage 
future improvements of global financial governance by evoking deliberative 
democracy, political equality and cosmopolitanism. As financial regulation is the 
main instrument through which global finance is shaped and governed nowadays, 
these principles should then be transmitted to regulatory arrangements. This 
paper focuses on a new conceptual approach to regulatory and governance issues 
in global finance, by employing the philosophical idea of cosmopolitanism. It 
argues that although as a concept, cosmopolitanism cannot mitigate all the 
flaws attributed to contemporary finance, its development and extension to 
international financial regulation that is promulgated by institutions of the 
global financial system, would represent a worthwhile endeavour in making 
global finance more accountable and just in the eyes of many.
Keywords: global financial system, financial governance, cosmopolitanism, 
financial regulation
Introduction
Every financial crisis transforms the manner in which the public perceives global 
finance, its governance and institutional organization. In this respect, the last 
financial turmoil was no exception, as it made policymakers and academics aware of 
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the fact that the global financial system was flawed at many levels: the institutional, 
political and unfortunately ethical. In addition, the crisis did not result from a 
specific exogenous failure, but rather it was a product of the system itself. Namely, 
the experienced turmoil resulted from the selection, implementation and assessment 
of poorly structured policy and regulatory decisions, taken because of policymakers’ 
nearsighted judgements (Barth, Caprio and Levine 2012, p. 5). Consequently, in a 
post-crisis environment the global financial system is once again under scrutiny, 
with many questioning its policy background, institutional set up and regulatory 
governance. 
Global finance today resembles the football game at the beginning of the 19th 
century. Before clear rules were stipulated, establishing the division between 
football and its harsher counterpart – rugby, there were no predetermined limits to 
participants’ behaviour in the sports’ field – they could kick the ball (and sometimes 
their opponents) any way they liked, causing major injury at times. Probably 
this game was enjoyable even then, but in the end, would we rather participate 
in that kind of competition or in its modern day version? It is evident that what 
transformed the game of football substantially were two simple things: commonly 
agreed rules and judges who enforced them. Let’s return this analogy to the world of 
global finance: if the financial system has to become ‘more fair’, or function at the 
benefit of the larger part of the world’s population (as opposed of today’s negligible 
few) where can we find the foundation for such substantial change? Could it be 
that, akin to a football game, rules are all it would take to make global finance 
more accountable and just? And if we agree that rules are fundamental instruments 
that drive global finance toward socially desirable ends, how to compromise on 
global obligatory rules? Finally, who should be the judges competent to supervise 
the enforcement of such rules? At present, there is no independent and accountable 
institution that would evaluate global financial governance from the public’s 
perspective, and the possibility of agreeing on one remains a contested issue in 
global politics. 
This is why during the acute phase of the crisis many urged global policymakers 
to make significant changes in the institutional structure of global financial 
governance, in view to accommodate the needs of changing economic realities. At 
the base of such requests was not only the economic issue of effectiveness of the 
regulatory framework imposed on finance globally, but also of its legitimacy in a 
radically transformed political and economic landscape. For decades globalization 
has shaped the environment in which financial markets and institutions operate, The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 4
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favouring their cross-border interaction and internalization at the expense of the 
national domain. But this has deprived the public and their national representatives 
of expertise and relevant information necessary to interact effectively in the global 
financial arena and to encourage international financial subjects to act on their 
behalf (Levine 2012, p. 41). Building upon this basic deficiency, it is possible to 
raise several points crucial for the future development of global finance (Burke and 
Puschra 2009, p. 3):
1) How to envisage a ‘new morality’ in finance that will allow the protection of the 
interest of many, as opposed to the negligible few? 
2) Which institutional arrangements can secure a well-governed and functioning 
global financial system? 
3) Can regulation, as a policy-instrument, contribute to a more just and fair global 
financial system?
This is where the ethical concept of cosmopolitanism emerges, formulating answers 
to all of these points in this paper. Namely, the global financial system already 
operates on the principles that can be considered cosmopolitan, but its regulatory 
governance (which shapes its effects and manages its externalities) remains 
essentially national (roughly, that of wealthy, industrialized countries) and 
therefore somewhat useless in the context of financial globalization. The question 
is how to resolve this paradox? Can cosmopolitanism, as a philosophical and ethical 
idea, be the ‘common ground’ for change? Could cosmopolitanism mitigate the 
instabilities of the global economy and allow a more just development of future 
financial arrangements? And how to change the basic global governance of finance 
by employing regulation centred on cosmopolitan concepts? 
This paper analyzes the idea of a cosmopolitan approach to the regulatory 
governance of global finance. Its discussion ventures beyond purely economic 
reasoning in explaining the multidimensional challenges faced by global finance 
exacerbated by the imperative for a new ethical dimension. In this sense, perhaps 
political inclusion, participation and democratic standards within global 
governance may be secured through regulatory instruments that encourage a more 
cosmopolitan approach to financial governance. This is why the paper introduces 
readers to the nascent connection between cosmopolitanism, regulation and global 
financial governance, and discusses the ‘added value’ of a cosmopolitan approach 
to this subject. This ‘added value’ means that cosmopolitanism highlights the 
principles of fairness and accountability, opens the door for an ethical outlook to 
global finance, one that is respectful of social and economic realities.The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 5
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The above noted introductory remarks, define the paper’s subject area and its 
theoretical framework. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the 
first section discusses ethical ambiguities that affect contemporary societies, 
primarily the processes of ‘marketization’ and ‘financialization’ and the quest for 
a new morality with respect to global economic arrangements. The second section 
introduces and defines cosmopolitanism by tracing its historical origins. It also 
points to the potential nexus between this philosophical idea and contemporary 
global finance. The third section gives a basic overview of the global financial 
system, its structure and governance. It also sketches solutions to current governance 
challenges in light of cosmopolitan principles. The economic rationale of 
regulation, its potential for encouraging participation and common ethical values in 
policy-making, is explained in the fourth section. Finally, the concluding remarks 
in the fifth section reference ideas and concepts and suggest that cosmopolitanism 
may be formulated as a promising, albeit challenging, approach that should guide 
future reforms of global finance. 
‘A new kind of morality’ for global finance
Modern global policy arrangements seem to follow Hegel’s view on morality, which 
states that morality is not universal and does not necessarily follow laws of reason, 
but it is rather embodied in the customs of each particular community. Therefore 
there is no such thing as global, universal morality. The result of such thinking is 
ethical relativism: there is no right or wrong because each individual, as a member 
of different, separate communities, has different views on what is right or wrong. 
But this leads to an impassable obstacle on establishing the moral limits to global 
finance. The only feasible solution is that there needs to be an alternate  take on 
this premise – a new kind of morality, one that transcends the boundaries of our 
communities. The same proposition is true with respect to the redesign of the global 
financial system and its governance, on the basis of common interests and greater 
public participation. However, this goal is burdened with a complex theoretical and 
ethical challenge: if global finance has to have moral limits how to determine a 
sense of morality acceptable to all communities? 
Michael Sandel’s work shows that there truly are moral limits to the scope of 
markets and finance in general. Sandel begins his argumentation by referencing 
markets, but it is evident that the thinking and discussion he develops is relevant for 
financial markets as well as finance in general. He departs from the premise that The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 6
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markets in general (and hence, finance in specific) by their description and nature, 
fall outside of moral concern since they do not pass judgments on the intrinsic 
worth of things people buy and sell. In the context of voluntary market exchange, 
different people evaluate goods differently and markets leave them free to act upon 
their own valuations. At this point a crucial dilemma emerges: should everything be 
up to sale or are there still some things that money shouldn’t buy in these markets? 
Sandel firmly believes that there are things that are not for sale, but sadly, these are 
becoming fewer and fewer, as everyday life gradually drifts from a market economy 
to a market society. The important difference between the two lies in this: a market 
economy is a valuable and effective tool for organizing productive activity, but a 
market society is a way of life in which market values seep into every aspect of 
human endeavour. Indeed, financial value dictates the majority of societal relations. 
The race for profit and financial wealth exhibited by financial actors is completely 
oblivious to the needs of the society. In a globalized economic world the financial 
sector – its markets, institutions and products, appear to have no boundaries, not 
only geographically but moral as well. But, as Sandel claims, this should not be 
the case. There are two valid reasons why markets and finance should not model 
everything in contemporary society. Both of this objections figure prominently in 
arguments concerning the moral limits of markets, but as they often go together, 
Sandel believes that it is important to disentangle them. One of these objections 
concerns inequality, the other one corruption. As for the objection on inequality, in 
a society where everything has its financial value and everything is for sale – goods, 
services, even the lives of unborn human beings – life is significantly harder for the 
ones with more modest means:
‘If the only advantage of affluence were the ability to afford yachts, sports cars and 
fancy vacations, inequalities of income and wealth would matter less than they do 
today. But as money comes to buy more and more, the distribution of income and 
wealth looms larger.’ (Sandel, 2012, p. 8)
This objection points out to the injustices that arise from coercion. Market 
exchanges are not as voluntary as neoliberal enthusiasts claim, people are often 
forced to buy and sell things under the condition of severe inequality or in case 
of dire economic necessity. But the solution for this problem is, at least in theory, 
easy. If goods were distributed according to the principles that are considered fair 
in general, this objection on markets would fail. How to adapt this argumentation 
to the issue of a more ethical or indeed cosmopolitan governance of global finance? 
First of all, Sandel’s observations materialize in the imbalance of powers in 
international financial institutions, responsible for global financial governance. The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 7
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In this context the prominent objections are those of ‘inequality’ and ‘distributive 
justice’. If inequality within the basic structure of society is too great, it will 
undermine the fairness of agreements between people. As Sandel (2012) rightly 
observes, in a starkly unequal society, people are not truly free to choose and pursue 
their values and ends. 
This imbalance of power is mirrored in the current global financial system (GFS), 
with policy decisions being made upon compromise heavily dependent from global 
political leverage. Until present, these compromises reflected global structural 
values of wealthier, industrialized countries, often leaving countries with ‘modest 
means’ (i.e. emerging economies, developing regions) open to economic compromise 
tainted with the bitter taste of (sometimes) political coercion. This is an extremely 
complicated issue that demands a re-examination of the current balance in global 
finance. Without opening the global financial governance to new types of policy 
thinking the global financial system will remain closed off to the views and 
interests of the majority. This in turn will perpetuate a strong sense of injustice 
with respect to the global financial system. 
The second objection to the ongoing marketization concerns corruption. This 
objection points to the degrading effect that market valuation and exchange has 
on certain goods and practices. According to this objection, certain moral and civic 
goods are diminished or corrupted if bought and sold for money. Sandel points to 
examples, such as military service, voting rights and the distribution of income 
and wealth. While the first two are significant especially for the preservation of 
a democratic state, the third is important for the governance of global economic 
relations. Even in a perfectly fair society, without unjust differences in power and 
wealth, there would still be things that money should not buy. The tradition of 
the conception of inequality and its reflection on societal relations actually goes 
back to Aristotle, and teaches us that severe inequality undermines freedom by 
corrupting the character of both the rich and poor. In the context of global finance, 
the ‘rich’ are constituted by financial markets and the finance industry (with 
their overwhelming affluence and policy influence) while the ‘poor’ comprise the 
vulnerable consumers of financial products (at present – without an advocate that 
would review financial polices in their interest). The ‘rich’ are accustomed to and 
driven by ambition, which makes them unwilling to obey, while the ‘poor’ pressed 
by life’s necessities are ill suited to rule. Based on such observations Aristotle 
concluded that persons of moderate means make the best citizens. But the increasing 
gap between the ‘rich’ and the ‘poor’ leads to the situation that rich and poor live The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 8
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separate ways of life. Separate ways of life mean separate values and interests. And 
if that poses a problem of governance on the national level, on the international one, 
the governance issue becomes insurmountable. While it is true that the consensus 
for a liberal market economy has somehow survived the financial meltdown, 
injustices or externalities created by markets remain. These externalities have 
especially devastating effects in the area of finance: by corrupting the possibility 
of a ‘disciplined pluralism’ markets thrive through experimentation with the 
profit motive encouraging them to take risks and ‘do things differently’ (Saggar, 
2012). This, in turn, does not produce the type of financial system that promotes 
competition, economic growth and improvements in human welfare (Barth, Caprio 
and Levine, 2012). The implication is then that public policies should strive to 
maximize market experimentation and challenge distortive usage of market powers. 
Adam Smith comes to mind with his balanced view of the relationship between 
governments and markets.  
The ethical complications associated with markets and finance in general, demand 
a new effort in determining social and economic values that will guide the processes 
of economic life in a globalized community. This is not a search for perfect 
morality; instead we could begin by requiring that actors of different background 
(private or public) and geo-political positions meet each other within an (in)formal 
forum and negotiate the common good that finance should generate to the society. 
Today there is a place for greater public participation, and even ‘public activism’, 
in financial governance if we wish to tame the externalities of global finance. 
For now, the global finance and its constituents: markets and institutions, serve 
mainly the interest of the few, whereas in the future global finance should serve the 
interest of the many. As there is a deep interest clash between these two groups, a 
genuinely global world can develop only on the condition of the universal consensus 
between their interests (Post-crisis World Institute 2009, p. 16) or a new kind of 
morality linked to the manner in which specific financial actors or global finance 
in general, function. Held (2010, p. 301) sums this as an ethical consensus of ‘social 
democratic globalization’: what global governance of finance needs is a more ‘social’ 
and ‘democratic’ agenda that will support the still prevalent notion of free markets, 
but within a policy framework of shared values and commonly agreed institutional 
processes. The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 9
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An ethical approach to global finance:  
the cosmopolitan idea
That there truly is a need for a new ethical outlook on the concept of value, not 
just on the value of the goods on the markets, but especially on the value of human 
life, is a valid proposition. It is also being loudly advocated by the majority of 
recent protests in the Western world. The departing premise is simple: as opposed to 
neoliberal claims, not everything should be up to sale. Or, in the context of global 
financial governance, in a post crisis environment global financial arrangements 
have come to a turning point: moving away from their purely instrumental and 
technocratic foundations towards a more ethical context that should level out 
negative externalities of financial interdependence. By incorporating its principles 
into various regulatory policies and instruments that now steer the direction of 
global finance, cosmopolitanism may offer a new and acceptable ethical approach 
to global financial arrangements in general, and their institutional governance 
in particular. Cosmopolitanism offers a fertile ground for developing a nuanced 
regulatory approach in finance, respectful of contemporary social realities. Its added 
value as a philosophical idea lies in the fact that it highlights the principles of 
fairness and accountability in societal relations, which can then be reflected in the 
relations between actors in the global financial sphere. The historical origin of the 
cosmopolitan paradigm explains why, so it deserves a closer examination.
A ‘new ethical outlook’ actually means that there is a need for a fresh outlook, 
one that is not prevalent nowadays. Cosmopolitanism, as an ethical, philosophical 
doctrine exists for over two millennia and in this sense it cannot be considered as 
brand new. Its beginnings can be found in ancient Greece, and indeed, the term 
‘cosmopolitanism’ derives from the Greek word ‘kozmopolites’, which means ‘citizen 
of the universe’. Kozmopolites is a layered concept that refers to two other concepts 
particularly important for the Hellenic cultural horizon - the cosmos (κόσμος, as 
the universe or the world in its broadest sense) and the polis (πόλις, as the city, that 
is also a basic political unity). The kozmos represents a complex order, characterized 
by harmony and governed by natural law. The polis, on the other hand, represents 
a bordered space in which inhabitants that share certain traditions constitute the 
political community and its laws. Taken together, kozmopolis is an ideal society, 
in which there are no foreigners nor strangers, and therefore no enemies. Modern 
and contemporary forms of cosmopolitanism follow some of these basic features 
of Hellenic cosmopolitanism, mostly in the claim that human beings belong to The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 10
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the same human community by virtue of their equal nature and their common 
rationality. 
This is just one aspect of the cosmopolitan thinking, one that we can name ethical 
cosmopolitanism. There are several others, as cosmopolitanism is a very broad idea 
with many of its advocates focusing on its different aspects (e.g. citizenship, liberty, 
human rights norms). This plurality of cosmopolitanism makes it an ‘ethical 
paradigm’ (Brasset, 2010) with its agenda sometimes difficult to apply to economic 
or financial matters. However, the departing premise of cosmopolitanism – that 
justice has to transcend national boundaries, and apply equally to all individuals 
– offers new ethical possibilities for economic relations, as part of social realities. 
This aspect of cosmopolitanism promotes the development of a single global 
economic market. As such, philosophers show it less support than economists and 
politicians, who are the most notable advocates of globalized economics. After the 
first Hellenic impulse, cosmopolitanism as a comprehensive doctrine has been in a 
state of prolonged ‘oblivion’. Its revival started with the ‘Age of Reason’ from the end 
of 17th century, until the beginning of the 19th century. Economic cosmopolitanism 
surfaced during this revival, hence its origins can be found in the teachings of 
authors such as François Quesnay or Adam Smith. Although there are important 
differences in their work, both authors have developed their economic teachings as 
an opposition to mercantilism, an economic doctrine that claimed that a nation’s 
wealth depended on the accumulation of gold and silver, and on stringent state 
regulation, imposing protective tariffs on foreign manufactured goods. Smith’s 
work, especially the ‘Wealth of the Nations’, claimed that rational self-interest 
and competition can lead to economic prosperity, and therefore there should be 
no boundaries to the reach of markets. In essence, Smith was a predecessor to the 
modern academic discipline of economics. With his claims on the ‘invisible hand’ 
that operates in the promotion of the good to the general society, when individuals 
pursue their own interests, he became – unintentionally, one of the patrons of the 
contemporary belief in free markets. Eventually, free trade has triumphed over 
mercantilism as a paradigm of world economics. 
At the same time, a somewhat similar doctrinal dispute was going on between 
proponents of cosmopolitanism and nationalism on the level of global political 
governance. The old medieval organization of Europe, with feudal lords and their 
subjects had already started to change in the Renaissance, when the new class of 
merchants-citizens staked its claim for more power in the political life. The radical 
change begun with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, however it did not destroy The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 11
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the old feudal order. But, with the creation of the concept of state sovereignty, it 
had laid the foundation for the formation of modern nation states. The final fall 
of the Ancien Régime came with the French Revolution in 1789. The Revolution 
was motivated by the big ideas of ‘liberté, égalité, fraternité’, all present in the 
cosmopolitan doctrine from ancient times. Those universalistic ideas also inspired 
the ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen’, along with the ‘U.S. 
Declaration of Independence’, a seminal text in the development of the individual 
rights of man. But eventually, the Revolution did not succeed in following those 
high ideals, and it ended not only in Terror, but its result was the rule of Napoleon, 
whose universalism had changed its nature from cosmopolitan into imperial. This 
in turn provoked its opponents to feel a sense of difference, an unknown sense of 
national pride, which consequently led to the forming of nation states. The process 
was unintentional, but it soon spread like wildfire across Europe. Nationalism took 
its first victory in Europe, and in just over a century, it had settled all over the 
world. By the end of 2nd World War, there were only few states in the world that 
were not constituted on some sort of nationalist foundation. By the middle of the 
20th century humanity truly lived in a political world whose basic building block 
was the nation state and nationalism. Cosmopolitanism did not have its place here, 
except in the promotion of free market policies. 
From this discrepancy, between states based on nationalistic principles and markets 
based on cosmopolitan ones, we arrive to the problems of the globalized society. 
Authors such as Dani Rodrik and David Held notice this discrepancy and call it 
a ‘globalization paradox’ (Rodrik 2011) or a ‘paradox of our times’ (Held 2010). 
Regardless of different terminology, the paradox is basically the same: why to rely 
on national systems of accountability and legitimacy, when decisions are nowadays 
largely being made at the global level? In the context of this discussion, the issue 
can be described as following: how to elaborate the cosmopolitan idea about global 
justice and democracy, in order to make sense of and provide critical reform agendas 
for the emerging practices of global financial governance (Brassett  2010)?  The idea 
to extend the cosmopolitan approach to global financial matters indicates a feasible 
way of implementing questions of ethics and justice in a domain where demands 
for accountability and inclusion have been repeatedly articulated. In addition, 
cosmopolitanism offers a possibility to re-think the theoretical basis of existing 
global structures, placing them in a better-defined interaction with actors of the 
global society: The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 12
 
Beroš, Marta Božina, Beroš, Marin (2013) ‘Fairness through regulation? Reflections on a 
cosmopolitan approach to global finance’, The Journal of Philosophical Economics, VII:1
‘While the complex and technical nature of finance may strike many ethical theorists 
as a strange place to begin an ethical discussion, it is clear that the dimensions and 
scope of contemporary global finance make in to less important in ethical terms. 
Global finance is a paradigm case of globalization.’ (Brassett 2006, p. 8)
By respecting the principles behind the cosmopolitan idea, the global financial 
system can be reformed to increase its accountability, participation and the 
perception of fairness. In this respect cosmopolitanism can be incorporated in both 
the institutional redesign of the financial architecture and the departing theoretical 
foundations of their policy-making, largely articulated through regulation (as 
we have seen in previous chapters). What cosmopolitanism offers is an ‘ethics of 
inclusion’ (Bohman 1999, 2004) that responds to public demands for the ‘universal 
morality’ or better yet for a ‘new kind of morality’ in global financial matters. 
Recently suggested reforms of the global financial architecture insist on preserving 
bureaucratic economic agendas of improving legitimacy through a combination 
of ‘state-centric institutions and private markets actors ‘ (Brassett 2006, p. 173). 
But this does not make finance more ethical in the public’s eyes. Admittedly, 
cosmopolitanism is a promising but limited blueprint for institutional reform of 
the post-Bretton Woods financial system. But the idea of promoting ‘cosmopolitan 
reason’ to wider audiences, including global financial institutions, is indeed a 
valuable contribution to the debate of organizing global finance in future:
‘(…) it is a good thing that larger and more diverse audiences are involved in a 
conversation about the potential suffering caused by global financial crises and the 
apolitical nature of technocratic financial governance. (…) This is not done as an 
exercise in critique for its own sake, but as an opportunity to identify alternative 
possible futures for global finance. Working at the limit of current ethical reasoning 
creates the space to suggest alternatives. Such discussions can disturb the black 
box of global finance and open it up to the broad based democratic conversation 
cosmopolitans seek.’ (Brasset 2006, p. 26)
Cosmopolitanism does offer a credible approach to escaping current alternative 
practices of global financial reform. At the same time it puts a heavy ethical burden 
on policy makers, namely that of caring not only for specific groups or actors 
within the financial community, but also for each and every person in the society 
on the basis of their human dignity. It is a heavy burden, but so was the forming 
of ‘patriotic sentiment’ in the 18th and 19th century, when people started to show 
more attention and to have more obligations towards people who up to then, were 
total strangers, and who afterwards have become compatriots. In the context of 
global finance, the circle of compatriots has to widen a little more, it has to embrace The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 13
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the international community and its needs as a whole. And this is a tremendous 
shift that will not happen overnight. Even more so, it is a change that has always 
been considered ‘terribly utopian’. Still, a fairer global financial system, and 
consequently a fairer society, deserves such a change, one that the world of finance 
needs constant reminding of. 
Cosmopolitan ethics extended to the sphere of global finance does not offer a 
pragmatic solution whose effectiveness can be measured against bureaucratic 
benchmarks something that can be proved or disproved. It does offer a new ‘way of 
thinking’ for global policymakers and their decision-making agenda (Brassett 2010). 
With cosmopolitanism at hand, the reform of the global financial system does not 
have to rely solely on market effectiveness or transaction profitability. Instead it 
can be envisaged on the basis of principles and instruments that would help reform 
financial governance in view of fairness as a global ethical demand, with a new 
balance attained between the interests and opportunities of all countries. Perhaps 
this is a somewhat ‘sentimental approach’ to articulating governance in global 
financial matters. But irrespective of their technocratic and (at least declarative) 
apolitical nature, global finance should serve the interests of the global society. 
This entity does share common values and moral boundaries in economic matters, 
so sentimental re-description is rather welcomed in this societal sphere. This is a 
significant remark to make at a time when global financial policies seem to diverge 
again from universal, public assumptions on global justice and participation. 
New concepts in governing the global financial system 
Currently, a host of regulatory reforms are underway on the global and national 
level, attempting to make the financial system more resilient to financial duress. 
Different facets of these reforms are discussed by policymakers and academics from 
a purely economic aspect, following a more technical delineation of the issue at 
hand. However, for reforms to be effective in securing sustainable global financial 
stability then the understanding of the concept of finance has to be broader. This is 
because today’s global financial situation requires coordinated efforts from many 
different actors, with a multi-layered perspective. In this sense the experienced 
financial crisis was much more than an economic meltdown. This was also a social 
disaster with unforeseen and devastating effects that will continue to mark the lives 
of many for years to come (Barth, Caprio and Levine 2012). The interconnection 
between economic causes and social consequences derives from the fact that The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 14
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contemporary finance actually functions as a complex ‘socio-spatial context’ 
(Brassett 2006, p. 38) whose accountability and legitimacy is determined by its 
political and ethical dimensions. And in the eyes of the international community, it 
is precisely the political and ethical dimensions that sustain the concept of stability 
of global finance. Hence, the scope of recent global reforms should transcend 
the purely economic rationale and target the repositioning of the theoretical 
foundations and ethical aspects of governance policies in finance. 
In a post-crisis environment many seem to agree that one of the most pressing 
problems of global finance is that of accountability. Accountability implies 
the participation in, or surveillance over, global policymakers (institutions, 
organization, etc.) whose policy decisions shape global finance and who are 
responsible to oversee its functioning. With financial internationalization and 
globalization, countries have delegated part of their national financial sovereignty 
(for instance, in the regulatory arena) to supranational authorities. These employ 
soft-law forms of governance, thus it is not surprising that the issue of international 
cooperation within these structures and of their accountability is politically and 
ethically sensitive. Helleiner and Porter (2009, p. 14) argue that the issue of 
accountability has three distinct facets: 1) uneven representation of countries and 
poor public participation, 2) the overtly technocratic nature of its institutions, and 
3) the persistent risk of a ‘policy bias’ (or regulatory capture) towards the financial 
industry. One of the benefits of such a global financial system is that it has the 
potential to be managed to deepen socialization processes that nurture mutual trust, 
accountability and minimize concerns expressed by the public. In this respect, 
reforms should target greater accountability of international authorities with 
respect to other (in)formal institutions, which are collectively more representative, 
and which advocate the promulgation of the ‘global public interest’ within finance 
(Helleiner and Porter, 2009). 
To discuss the role of participation and publicity in global financial governance and 
its leading authorities further, requires a basic introduction to the global financial 
system: its definition, institutional architecture and decision-making processes. This 
allows imagining new forms of transparency and accountability that could subject 
policy-making institutions to greater public control. Today’s finance is detached 
from the, historically prevalent, national domain of exclusive economic sovereignty. 
This is a result of powerful political and market processes that are global in their 
scope. In this sense, contemporary finance focuses on the interplay of financial 
institutions, policymakers and companies on a supranational level, constantly The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 15
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shaped by international market movements. It is a system whose practices and 
institutions are driven by globalized dynamics that affect national policy makers 
and consequently affect national financial frameworks. Indeed, over the past sixty 
years the international financial system has moved away from its organization of 
isolated domestic financial systems based on predetermined relationships, toward 
an increasingly global and volatile financial mechanism (Arner and Buckley 2011). 
Broadly defined, the term ‘global financial system’ (GFS) refers to the international 
monetary system with its official understandings, agreements, conventions and 
institutions, as well as to the private and official processes, institutions and 
conventions associated with private financial activities (Schinasi and Truman 2010, 
p. 3). The idea is that the GFS functions as an interconnected, regulated network 
between private financial institutions, national authorities and international 
institutions that coordinate their interactions. The goal of these institutions is 
rather simple: to secure the most effective modes of governance through rules that 
consider interests and roles of all actors concerned. But to calibrate the actions of 
these institutions, authorities and subjects, through rules is a demanding job:
‘The economics is complex. The politics tricky. And the economic and political 
ingredients are constantly changing as economics evolve, financiers innovate, lobbyist 
lobby, and older political constituencies weaken as new ones emerge.’ (Barth, Gerard, 
Levine 2012, p. 21)
These facts have been clearly demonstrated by the recent crisis. The current 
institutional backbone of the GFS does not reflect current economic and political 
realities. Institutional structures promulgated inadequate financial policies that 
ultimately undermined the effectiveness of global financial governance, and 
exacerbated the issue of accountability of the GFS. There are several reasons 
for such behaviour of the GFS’ institutions. But the most obvious one is that 
today’s global financial architecture was designed in the period of World War 
II. It was in fact the 1944 negotiations at Bretton Woods that gave the contours 
to the international institutional framework we know today: its formal design, 
international treaties and soft-law mode of governance. Through the years the 
system has experienced modifications of institutional arrangements and instruments 
employed, adapting to changing circumstances prompted by financial liberalization, 
technological innovations and lessons from several crises (e.g. Mexican or ‘Tequila’, 
Asian and other). Although modifications were made, the backbone of the GFS 
remained the same, with the central institutional role in finance played by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its developmental counterpart, the World The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 16
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Bank. The core levels on which the system operates, remain unaltered at present 
(Arner and Buckley 2011, p. 18):
(1) the political one, with the policy discourse developed within the group of 
countries with greatest political and economic leverage (G7, G8 and G10),  
(2) the standard-setting one, largely technocratic in its nature with the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) taking the 
lead role,  
(3) the implementing level, focused on national convergence with agreed 
arrangements with the help of regional and multilateral organizations, and 
(4) the monitoring level, with the IMF and the World Bank (the latter with a focus 
on economic development and poverty reduction).  
In this form of ‘networked governance’ that still persists, it is operationally and 
politically challenging to effectively manage the governance framework of global 
finance (Schinasi and Truman 2010, p. 10). Publicly demanded improvements of 
the GFS accountability require alternations in focus along the lines of commonly 
agreed responsibilities, as well as in coordination between public authorities and 
international financial institutions. One of the strongly advocated demands is that 
the GFS should become more accountable to all the world states rather than to the 
few wealthy, industrialized countries that now lead its operations. This is because:
‘Over the past decade, developing countries were increasingly pressured by markets and 
the Bretton Woods institutions to adopt financial standards and codes whose content 
they played little or no role in developing. Not surprisingly, the content of those 
standards and codes was often deemed inappropriate for local conditions and also 
designed to favour industrialized country interests.’ (Helleiner and Porter 2009, p. 16)
In this respect, the promulgation of the ‘the common interest’ and greater acceptance 
of global financial policies could be achieved by extending the institutional 
membership and the participation in the policy-making process. It is clear then 
that the GFS future improvements have to respect nascent socio-economic realities 
and strive for a pronounced participative dimension in policy-making. And this is 
where the concept of cosmopolitanism offers a fresh approach in respect of global 
institutional arrangements in finance. Following this premise it is possible to 
identify three key entities that have the potential of coordinating private, financial 
markets’ incentives with national economic interests along the lines of cosmopolitan 
principles: the G20, the FSB, and finally the IMF. 
The G20, established in 1999 as a direct response to the so called Mexican and then 
Asian crisis, acts as an informal political steering group, which issues guidelines The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 17
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for future financial reform (through regulatory initiatives) and oversees the 
functioning of the international financial architecture overall (Giovanoli 2010, 
p. 99). By the own wording of the G20, its scope is: to provide an informal forum 
where the interaction and exchange of ideas between industrial and emerging-
market economies can offer new solutions on key issues related to global stability. 
In its first ten years the G20 kept a low profile without major involvement in 
the international standard setting process (Giovanoli 2010, p. 103). This is partly 
due to the fact that this organization has no formal legitimacy and thus no legal 
competence to impose binding rules on its participants or other countries. On 
another level, this is because within the international financial sphere, the IMF was 
seen as the lead institution not only with respect to monitoring, but to regulatory 
initiatives as well. Hence the G-20 acts simply as a forum for discussion, whose 
concluding remarks are then brought to the formal international structures, to be 
incorporated as part of future policy arrangements. Although for many years the 
G20’s informal approach was shadowed by more formal multilateral arrangements 
led by Bretton Woods’ institutions, recent reforms, articulated at the groups’ 
Washington meeting in November 2008 and the London meeting in April 2009, gave 
a new weight to G20 discussions and its conclusions on pressing financial issues. 
Mainly this is due to the notable extension of the representativeness of emerging 
economies in the G20, even though this representation still remains uneven in geo-
political terms and so issues of legitimacy persist. But even if all countries were 
secured a seat at the table, further expansion would hinder productivity of informal 
discussions and prolong the groups’ actual decision-making (Dervis 2009, p. 27). 
This is not to say that reform dynamics should not continue, especially in view of 
preserving the G20’s informal nature and speedy decision-making process. Formal 
and binding international decisions, for the time being, should remain a competence 
of international institutions with near universal membership.
At this point the IMF enters the scene, as a high profiled international institution 
with more than sixty years of international financial experience and credibility 
dependent on its Bretton Wood heritage. This is a formal international institution 
with a potential for governance reforms in light of today’s realities. In its 
beginnings the IMF was preoccupied with international monetary stability, which 
it monitored by focusing on the exchange rate and the removal of restrictions on 
payments. This narrow policy focus of the IMF, formalized in its statute (Articles 
of Agreement), is understandable if we keep in mind the fact that back in the 1950s 
the international monetary system represented the whole GFS, with a very modest The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 18
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role for private incentives (i.e. financial institutions). But, as time passed, the 
focus of the IMF broadened towards the global financial system. This orientation 
of the IMF has brought forward transparency issues in regards of its governance 
and issues of accountability, at present still vividly discussed among experts. This 
vibrant academic interest for IMF’s institutional potentials has much to do with 
its possibility of securing ‘global public good’ in future financial policies, along the 
line of its existing mandate of precautionary finance and macroeconomic stability 
(Dervis 2009, p. 29). Prospects of reform will have to target both governance 
issues and the use of resources. And although the modification of resources to the 
needs of many emerging economies is addressed through new monetary facilities, 
the governance reform is more difficult to make. Governance reform of the IMF 
not only requires the revision of participating quotas, but also of voting quotas 
that is set depending on a country’s leverage in international economic relations. 
By opening up the governance issue, a Pandora’s box of interlinked problems is 
opened, such as international political economy, divergent political interests and 
challenged institutional legitimacy in a world of changing economic realities. 
Whatever the path of IMF’ reform may be, in order for its policy to be inclusive 
and impartial to immediate political interests, then the IMF will have to be subject 
to scrutiny and review of public expert advisors. Dervis (2009, p. 33) suggests that 
this ‘impartial judgment’ could be provided by experts congregated either in an 
informal group or as part of an existing international institution. This is a laudable 
proposition, whose conceptual essence and institutional sketching resemble that of 
the ‘Sentinel’ proposed by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2012). The driving idea is to 
provide the public with greater participation in policy-development, by ensuring 
an institutional point for public discourse on financial policies developed within 
the formal international financial sphere.  This is where the potential for further 
development of the interaction between the IMF and its international counterparts 
lies. The first that comes to mind is the Financial Stability Board.
The FSB, as an expanded successor of the Financial Stability Forum established 
in 1999 by G7 countries, was institutionally renewed in April 2009 at the G20 
London Summit when it was awarded a broadened mandate in view of financial 
stability promotion. The task of the FSB is to envisage ways in which existing 
externalities in global finance could be internalized, through information 
sharing and to develop codes and best practices in financial regulation (Schinasi 
and Truman 2010, p. 28). In its role of a ‘regulatory think thank’ the FSB seems 
suitable to act as an institutional mechanism that coordinates national interests 
with financial policy development. However, his weakness is that it still lacks The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 19
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legal personality under international or private law (Giovanoli 2010), which 
clearly hinders its accountability and leverage in the international arena. Also, the 
restrictive membership of the FSB (currently set to comprise G20 countries and the 
EU) gives it less legitimacy with respect to the IMF, for example. In this sense, a 
closer cooperation between these institutions – the sanctioned surveillance powers 
of the IMF with the policy-making potential of the FSB – could be an immediate 
pragmatic solution for a more inclusive development of global financial policies 
(Eatwell 2009, p. 43). Indeed, such strengthened roles of the IMF and FSB would 
be better suited to capture the interest of the many as opposed to the negligible 
few (roughly represented by the wealthiest, industrialized countries) making 
international governance networks more trustworthy and accountable. In other 
words:
‘(…) working with the existing networked properties of global governance is not 
simply a second best alternative that less powerful states and citizens must reluctantly 
accept because of their lack of influence. It is instead the best way right now to work 
towards a system in which relatively small numbers of unaccountable elites will never 
again be able to bring down the world economy.’ (Helleiner and Porter 2009, p. 24)
Regardless of the prevailing stance that none of institutions underpinning the GFS 
are now worth of a high vote of confidence, they shouldn’t be dismissed completely. 
These are institutional structures that still develop and promote commonly agreed 
standards and other important guidelines in global financial matters even when 
measured against new requests for greater accountability and participation. True, 
their policies proved to be much less effective in dynamic, complex financial 
relations, as they worked on overly simplistic assumptions. It is time for an update 
of concepts, for increased participation and transparent decision-making processes 
in the GFS. The search for new formats of interaction in the global institutional set 
up should be encouraged through regulation developed within these structures. This 
is because regulation, as a very effective policy instrument, can integrate national 
financial interests into the international context in a sustainable manner (Arner 
2007). 
Articulating ‘fairness’ in global financial regulation 
A just and well-governed global financial system does not rely solely on its 
institutional structure; it also depends from the quality of regulation developed 
within these networks. This is why the post crisis environment has proved to be The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 20
 
Beroš, Marta Božina, Beroš, Marin (2013) ‘Fairness through regulation? Reflections on a 
cosmopolitan approach to global finance’, The Journal of Philosophical Economics, VII:1
beneficial for the prolific discussion about the optimal regulatory framework in 
the context of global finance. Currently, one of the most pressing topics on the 
international financial agenda is the re-design of the global financial regulation, 
with experts often stating the ultimate goal of a more resilient, stronger and 
transparent global financial system. As human civilization has become intrinsically 
connected, globalization has had a profound impact in the area of economic life, 
making some of the most fundamental economic problems today – such as effective 
economic governance or the management of financial stability, issues that cannot 
be solved by countries or individuals acting alone. Hence, financial regulation has 
to respond not only to national or regional economic requests, but also create new 
forms of accountability and greater participation in decision-making. To this end 
global financial regulation comes as an effective tool, one that can subject different 
economic processes (e.g. financial liberalization and integration) to better political 
control and management. 
But what does this ‘global financial regulation’ entail? The term refers primarily 
to standards developed by institutions competent for global financial governance 
and promulgated in the form of soft law, through which global cooperation on 
some of the most urgent economic issues that affect our ‘overlapping communities 
of fate’ is encouraged (Guibernau 2002). This type of regulatory intervention has 
a decisive role in ensuring public confidence in global finance understood as a 
system that should produce socially desirable outcomes and consequently, make 
finance more just and trustworthy. Indeed, the crisis has unmasked the self-
endorsed assumption that the individual hand of actors who behave in a self-
interested manner will produce efficient markets, and henceforth finance. What 
is now evident is that markets and finance in general, crucially depend on certain 
key services that private actors will not supply adequately; namely for markets 
and finance to function in a voluntary, efficient and just manner they require the 
authority of a civil government, system of justice and institutional infrastructure 
that facilitate the relations within a social community, in the broader sense (Barth, 
Caprio, Levine 2012, p. 43). Financial regulation is arguably the best example of a 
service provided by public authorities in the interest of the overall society. Indeed, 
regulatory intervention in finance is much more pronounced that in any other 
sector of the economy. This is because finance is part of the information industry, 
where information are managed and traded by (mostly) private actors: financial 
institutions and markets. But these actors do not necessarily act on behalf of the 
public; rather they use their expertise and resources to successfully manage their 
profits. Irrespective of this, the crisis taught us that finance performs well only The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 21
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when private rewards are aligned with wider social interest. Hence, incentives 
matter in finance, but when incentives are distorted we get distorted behaviour. 
This is why finance is regulated and supervised more attentively than any other 
sector of the economy – be it national, regional or global. As finance exhibits such 
information asymmetries that may cause serious markets failures with socially 
devastating consequences, it then deserves an interventionist approach that will 
guarantee coherence of private and wider social interests. Indeed, the social 
costs associated with the failure of a single financial institution, or the collapse 
of an entire financial system (not to mention one with global significance) are 
indisputably higher than costs associated with the failure of other economic sectors. 
This is why ever well functioning financial system requires a balance between 
regulatory intervention and its constituting elements: financial institutions and 
markets. This was clearly demonstrated during the last financial crisis where 
divergent interests and ethical groundings allowed the proliferation of structured 
financial products giving rise to unwise underwriting practices, to which some of 
the biggest mortgage lenders to the public were exposed (such as with government 
sponsored enterprises in the US) causing devastating social damage. 
In addition to market characteristics and forces, regulation is also shaped by the 
theoretical and ideological basis of law and economics. As noted by Yergin and 
Stanislaw (1998), the 20th century was a battle of ideas and a battle between two 
different models of the role of government in the economy, with the capitalist 
models focusing on the self fulfilling role of markets with limited government 
intervention, and the communist models focusing on central planning through state 
ownership and control.  The capitalist models proved superior to the communist 
one during the 1980s, hence during the last decades the global financial system 
has developed under the influence of a specific capitalist doctrine: neoliberalism. 
Without entering into conceptual details of neoliberalism, it is possible to 
summarize that this doctrine operated on the assumption that financial markets 
gather, process and transmit relevant information regarding the real counterparts in 
finance and the condition of borrowers in a rationally efficient manner (McKinnon 
1973). Consequently, the rise of this trail of thought in economics has spread the 
presumption in favour of absolutely free markets and advocated strong deregulation, 
as the premise was that government intervention through regulation will tend 
only to lower the inherent efficiency of the markets. Recent research, however, 
has demonstrated that the neoliberal doctrine has abstracted a number of critical 
features of global finance, the most notable of all being – uncertainty. Namely, if 
financial systems are ‘left to their own devices’ through deregulation, they do not The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 22
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produce efficient outcomes in conditions when relevant information is imperfect. 
Rather, they are prone to market instabilities such as information asymmetry and 
social externalities, which have recently come to prevail on the global market level, 
leading global finance to resemble a ‘global casino’ with financial investments 
founded on speculation rather then information, and with devastating economic and 
social consequences. 
The reality is that nowadays no economic activity exercised within a community can 
be absolutely free of norms or other forms of regulatory intervention, since different 
types of legal arrangements limit the interference of individual market actions with 
the legitimate interests of others within the society. Simply put: ubi societas ibi ius. 
By establishing the ‘rules of the game’ regulations govern the spontaneous order 
of economic life through legislation. This is valid not only for national financial 
systems, but even more so for global finance. It is precisely in a global context 
that ‘best practice’ standards, soft law instruments and regulation in general are 
fundamental to stability, economic growth and equality. 
But to design a uniform set of financial regulations for all countries around the 
world, is a daunting task to say modestly. Yes, basic regulatory principles are valid 
almost everywhere in the world (i.e. those of prudential regulation, systemic, code of 
conduct, etc.) but the unique political, legal and economic characteristics that shape 
the design of international financial policies evolve over time (Barth, Caprio and 
Levine 2012, p. 50). To complicate the issue even more, the international financial 
institutions develop and promulgate financial and regulatory policies on the basis 
of political compromises rather than objective assessments of global financial 
conditions dependent on the specific economic cycle of different countries. Over the 
years, global regulatory standards in finance were developed under the dominance 
of industrialized countries, which exhibit significant leverage in decision-making. 
This is why many countries around the world have often characterized ‘best practice’ 
standards and other global regulatory guidelines as unfair. Fairness, of course, is an 
elusive and multifaceted concept, but in regards of global financial regulation its 
core could be described as follows: it is the problem of regulators standing back and 
looking to see who will have the upper hand in global finance and public services, 
and then tailoring regulatory responses to the needs of this most influential group 
(Saggar 2012, p. 3). Furthermore, fairness in global financial regulation necessarily 
implies a form of partnership between regulators (i.e. the institutional backbone 
of the GFS) and the ‘users’ of regulatory policies (i.e. national states). The current 
GFS did not work in their interest at large, as many countries were excluded from The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 23
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institutional membership or lacked the political or economic leverage to compel 
regulators to act in that manner. This objection relates to the previously discussed 
issue of redesigning the institutional structure of global finance. Namely, it is only 
by enabling international institutions to promote improvements in global regulatory 
policies that work in the interest of the majority of the world’s community, that a 
check on fairness will be provided. Recent reforms sidestep this crucial challenge:
‘Reforms emerging from the US Congress, Basel, the United Kingdom, the European 
Union, and many other countries and organizations do not squarely address the 
deeply rooted, institutional weaknesses in the regulatory apparatus that led to so 
many critical problems affecting so many people. (…) reform efforts primarily 
provide fleeting palliatives, not enduring improvements to the process for selecting, 
implementing, evaluating, and reforming financial regulations.’ (Barth, Caprio and 
Levine 2012, p. 204)
All the mainstream views to recent regulatory reforms (e.g. greater information 
transparency, inclusiveness of developing states in the decision making processes) 
are insufficient to address such challenges and in this lies the possibility for 
a new approach to regulating global finance (Brassett 2006, p. 47), attaining 
fairness or linking commonly agreed moral values to the manner global finance 
is being governed today. And with this remark, a fundamental issue regarding 
the conceptual basis of the required change is posed: what could constitute the 
common ground on which the post crisis society could design such a regulatory 
approach that would introduce concepts of fairness, and ethics in general, in an 
otherwise technocratic field of global finance. To determine this common ground 
is not straightforward, as ethics is a highly contested domain. However, it is 
only by working on sensible and sustainable ethical arguments that the GFS can 
regain its legitimacy in the eyes of the global community. As has been already 
argued cosmopolitanism offers a credible approach to escaping current alternative 
practices of global financial reform. Strange (1995, p. 171) succinctly verbalizes this 
intention: ‘the horizons of moral philosophy (…) no longer end at the frontiers of the 
state.’ By adhering to this proposition we can create a dynamic site of interaction 
between the society and the global financial community, built on the assumption 
that the reform of global finance through commonly agreed ethical values, 
embedded in various regulatory policies promulgated by global policymakers, is 
both possible and desirable. These issues have to be echoed in the design of recently 
proposed global regulatory policies and the reputation and accountability of policy-
makers (Saggar 2012, p. 12). It is evident that global financial regulation has come 
to a turning point in its development that will require a radical paradigm shift in The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 24
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its design. This ‘paradigm shift’ has multiple dimensions, and one may well be the 
shift in the international seat of regulatory power. However, one that is particularly 
significant is that the underlying intellectual and soft power considerations in the 
regulation of global finance have to embody specific common arguments in order 
to create a stronger feeling of participation and legitimacy in the eyes of the ‘post 
crisis society’. In this global context, regulation rests on the acceptance by others 
of agreed ethical underpinnings for global financial arrangements. Therefore, to 
maintain sound incentives in global financial regulation and to reach for fairness 
in regulatory policies, the global financial system must adapt to changing socio-
economic realities. Current global regulatory initiatives are simplistic solutions 
that do not acknowledge different influences in global finance. What global 
financial regulation deserves is coherence in addressing intricate policy decisions, 
by creating a system of ‘checks and balances’ that works for the majority of world 
countries (Barth, Caprio and Levine 2012, p. 55) and this is why the potential of the 
cosmopolitan idea deserves to be explored in global finance.
Conclusions
The views expressed in this paper seem as easy targets for criticism. The most 
straightforward criticism may well be this: as with most theoretical works, the 
paper does not offer practical solutions. But practical solutions are easy, or at least 
more straightforward. What is more difficult is to envisage changes in the manner 
we reflect upon, and perceive, societal relations in our ‘overlapping communities 
of faith’. To increase awareness on dilemmas that now pervade global finance 
means to solve numerous questions and problems of ethics that now exist, and to 
venture on a quest for something so elusive as ‘universal values’ or ‘a new kind of 
morality’. But as every thrilling and daunting journey, this one too begins with 
the first, small step. In the context of this examination, the first step forward is 
to understand that finance in general and global finance in particular, are not 
‘inherently evil’. It is only when exercised unconscientiously – with excessive risk 
taking and poor accountability patterns that finance can cause extensive damage, 
whose consequences spill over from the economic domain to the broader social 
environment. But, as Barth, Caprio and Levine (2012) rightly point finance is not 
destined to resemble a big casino, where only the chosen wealthy few come to place 
their bets. Moreover, finance is not moral at all, precisely because one of its main 
characteristics is that it does not take moral considerations into account. Morality 
should not be demanded from ‘finance’ but rather from the persons or ‘free agents’ The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 25
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that take part in various transactions in the financial flow. In the background of 
every market exchange, behind every numeral in finance, there are human lives 
influenced by such transactions. And those lives also have dignity, which should be 
valued and protected. It is exactly this central significance of finance with respect 
to social prosperity, that demands a closer reflection on how to justify contemporary 
financial arrangements in the eyes of many: its global domain, institutional 
underpinning and policy-commitments. 
The quality of ‘fairness’ demanded by the public as an imperative for global 
financial matters in general, has a strong ethical background. And this ethical 
commandment is something that should be reflected in future reforms of global 
finance especially, because for many decades this social domain has been dominated 
by the concept of ethical relativism. Such relativism was founded on contemporary 
global policy arrangements that functioned on the premise that morality is not 
universal. But as clear moral limits to global finance are being loudly demanded 
by the public, the quest for a different, new kind of morality emerges: one that 
will redesign the global financial system and its governance by respecting common 
interests and allow broader public participation. Globalized financial markets 
operating on structured financial products that transcend national geographical 
boundaries and impact economic cycles from a distance, suggest that there are many 
ethical loopholes worthy of research attention. At the same time, the potential 
benefits of a inclusionary and participative global financial system emerge as 
normative possibilities that imply significant corrections to current institutional 
power structures (Brassett 2006): to their membership, representation, inclusiveness, 
which should ultimately reflect in their policymaking. At last, regulation could 
attain more fairness if developed within a forum non-dependent on political and 
economic leverage, but on commonly agreed moral boundaries in financial matters. 
The possibility of developing global finance on the principles of cosmopolitan ethics 
is a significant idea worthy of further academic examination. Although it can 
hardly be considered as brand new, regardless of the fact that cosmopolitanism was 
never a dominant idea in economic governance, it is a fresh, commonly acceptable 
outlook to current obstacles. This is not search a for perfect morality; instead it is 
a lookout for closer cooperation between different geo-political actors, for louder 
public activism with respect to financial governance, and – in the words of David 
Held – for a ‘social democratic globalization’ in the sphere of global finance. A 
starting point in this direction may be to develop global finance with respect to 
concepts of cosmopolitan democracy, or cosmopolitan ethics in general.The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 26
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Global finance today functions as a complex economic, political and social context 
whose boundaries are determined by commonly agreed political and ethical 
dimensions. One of the benefits of such a global financial system (GFS) is that 
it could be managed to deepen socialization processes and minimize specific 
accountability concerns expressed by the public. Publicly demanded improvements 
of the GFS institutional structure require alternations along the lines of commonly 
agreed responsibilities. The system should become more accountable to all countries 
rather than to the few wealthy, industrialized ones. In this respect, reforms should 
make international authorities more accountable to other (in)formal institutions, 
existing or new, collectively more representative with respect to the ‘global public 
interest’. Perhaps it is the extension of the institutional membership and of the 
participation in the policy-making process that would make global financial 
policies more acceptable and supported. 
Regardless of the poor vote in confidence that institutions of the GFS collect 
nowadays, one cannot dismiss the fact that they are the ‘second-best solution’ 
for developing international, voluntary financial policies. True, in a globalized 
environment they are measured against stricter accountability and participation 
requests, which can only be satisfied by taking a different approach to the policies 
developed by these institutions. And since financial regulation is their most 
effective policy-making approach, loud demands for fairness are being primarily 
directed to regulatory matters. How to make regulation ‘fair’ in the eyes of the post-
crisis society? In essence, by achieving a paradigm shift; the underlying intellectual, 
reputational and soft power considerations in the regulation of global finance have 
to embody specific arguments in order to create a stronger feeling of participation 
and legitimacy of the global financial system in the eyes of many.  As regulation 
rests on the acceptance by others of agreed theoretical underpinnings to common 
regulatory arrangements for finance, monitored through a system of ‘checks and 
balances’ (along the lines of the existing GFS architecture) that works for the 
majority of world countries. 
Extending cosmopolitan ethics to the sphere of global finance will not offer a 
straightforward, pragmatic solution whose effectiveness can be measured against 
administrative benchmarks or one that can be proved or disproved. However, it does 
offer a new way of thinking in this globalized community that should influence 
the decisions of global policymakers. The solution of the cosmopolitan approach 
seems easy – in order to make the global finance system more just, regulations and 
institutions have to be designed in a specific manner, meaning that they need to be The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 27
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grounded on commonly agreed values, on some type of ‘universal ethics’. Primarily 
this means that the obsolete outlook to global finance, with its instrumental and 
technocratic foundations, has to be surpassed in favour of a more ethical context 
that levels out negative effects of global financial interdependence. Perhaps 
cosmopolitanism takes governance issues to a somewhat sentimental narrative, but 
in the era of market dominance and profit-led governance solutions, sentimental re-
addressing can only benefit the debate on global financial issues.
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